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The Easterlin Paradox refers to the fact that happiness data are typically stationary in spite of 
considerable increases in income. This amounts to a rejection of the hypothesis that current income 
is the only argument in the utility function. One possible answer is that human development 
involves more than current income (e.g., as argued by the UN). We find that the happiness 
responses of almost 400,000 people living in the OECD during 1975-97 are positively correlated 
with absolute income, the generosity of the welfare state and (weakly) with life expectancy; it is 
negatively correlated with the average number of hours worked, measures of environmental 
degradation (SOx emissions), crime, openness to trade, inflation and unemployment; all after 
controlling for country and year dummies. The estimated effects separate across groups in a 
manner that appears broadly plausible (e.g., the rich suffer environmental degradation more than 
the poor). Based on their actual change, the biggest contributors to happiness in our sample have 
been the increase in income and the increase in life expectancy. Our accounting exercise suggests 
that the unexplained trend in happiness is even bigger than would be predicted if income was the 
only argument in the utility function. In other words, introducing omitted variables worsens the 
income-without-happiness paradox.  
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1.  Introduction 
[It] does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the 
joy of their play.  It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our 
marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials.  
It measures neither our courage, nor our wisdom, nor our devotion to our country.  
It measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile ….. 
Senator Robert Kennedy on GDP1
 
A number of social observers have pointed out that the enormous increases in income in the industrial 
democracies over the last century do not seem to be accompanied by differences in happiness.
2 In a 
seminal paper, Easterlin (1974) showed that one could approach these issues using what are now called 
"happiness data", namely the responses that individuals give concerning a simple well-being question 
such as "Are you Happy?" Using data for the US, he showed that happiness responses in a particular year 
were positively correlated with an individual’s income. But over time, the average happiness response 
was untrended in spite of a sharp increase in average income levels. More recently, Blanchflower and 
Oswald (2000) have showed a similar pattern for the period following the publication of Easterlin’s 
paper (see also Easterlin (1995)). Similar findings, or with very slight detectable trends, have been 
observed in a variety of countries (see, for example, Veenhoven (1993), Inglehart and Klingemann 
(2000), inter alia) 
 
Economists have argued that these findings reflect the fact that the true utility function looks different 
from that assumed in the standard model. Easterlin (1974) himself argued that a utility function that 
captured a concern for relative income could explain these findings.
3 Others have argued that 
comparisons with one's own past are enough to explain the puzzle. For example, habit formation may 
lead individuals to become accustomed to high income, so that only increases in income result in 
happiness gains (see, Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) for a review).
4 In this paper we do not deny the 
importance of this view, or the usefulness of a broader theoretical approach based on psychology. In 
fact our approach can be regarded as a direct application of experienced utility theory (see, for example, 
 
1 Cited in Mankiw (1999). 
2 An early warning on the limits to growth was put forth by the Club of Rome in 1972. See also Scitovsky (1976), Hirsch 
(1976), inter alia. 
3 The main challenge for including interdependent preferences seems to be deriving restrictions on equilibrium behavior to 
provide the theory with empirical bite. The literature on the topic is quite large. Pollack (1976), Hirsch (1976), Scitovsky 
(1976), Frank (1985, 1999) and Clark and Oswald (1998), amongst others, as well as Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949), 
have made related arguments. Frey and Stutzer (2002) discuss relative income and the happiness evidence. Brown, Gardner, 
Oswald and Qian argue that it’s a person’s ranked position that matters (instead of their wage relative to the average wage). 
4 See also Duesenberry (1949), Pollack (1970), Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000), Clark (1999), Easterlin (2001), inter alia.   3
                                                
Kahneman and Thaler (1991)).
5 But we argue that a natural hypothesis is that omitted variables could 
also explain it. Thus, we study if the apparent paradox of flat happiness with rising income is not simply 
a result of failing to take into account changes in other relevant variables such as pollution or hours 
worked, to name just two variables that could have accompanied income growth and that a standard 
model predicts may reduce utility.  
 
Our approach, then, echoes the arguments made in debates surrounding the appropriateness of using 
GDP as an indicator of development. In 1973 William Nordhaus and James Tobin famously asked “Is 
Growth Obsolete?”. Their answer was a partial yes. They argued in favor of making adjustments to GNP 
so that some value was given to leisure and household work and some costs to urbanization. They then 
constructed what they called a Measure of Economic Welfare for the American economy and observed that 
it grew like GNP over the period under study, albeit more slowly. The Kennedy quote at the beginning 
of the paper shows the enormous appeal that this logic has, well beyond economists. Indeed, a variety 
of authors and organizations have advocated more comprehensive measures of well-being, capturing 
other elements of modern life besides income, in particular environmental degradation.
6 One way to 
read our paper is as offering some guidance on the weights to be used in such aggregation. 
 
Our approach to study these questions relies on using a variant of the happiness data analyzed by 
Easterlin (1974). These consist of the answers given by hundreds of thousands of people, across many 
countries and years, to a simple well-being question such as “On the whole, are you satisfied with the life you 
lead?”. Such data have been used extensively in psychology research where it is argued that the data pass 
a series of what are sometimes called validation exercises (see, for example, Kahneman, Diener and 
Schwartz (1999)). The most convincing of these, perhaps, consist of showing that happiness data 
 
5 Rabin (1998) makes the connection to well-being data explicitly. Ng (1996) discusses the theoretical structure of subjective 
well-being responses while Kahneman et al (1997) propose a formal axiomatic defense of experienced utility (see also 
Tinbergen (1991) and van Praag (1991)). van Praag (1971) is an early attempt to operationalize the concept of experienced 
utility based on verbal qualifiers, focusing on income satisfaction. See also section 2 in Frey and Stutzer (2002). 
6 There are many such indicators of welfare. Perhaps the most famous of this is the human development index in the 
Human Development Report produced by the United Nations. Considerable impetus to develop a national environmental 
indicator set occurred following the 1989 G-7 Economic Summit Leaders' request to the OECD to develop indicators in the 
context of improved decision-making. Canada is one of the most advanced in this sense, after passing the Well-Being 
Measurement Act (Bill C-268) with the purpose of developing and regularly publishing measures to indicate “the economic, 
social and environmental well-being of people, communities and ecosystems in Canada”. Its key provisions require a Standing Committee 
of the House of Commons to “receive input from the public through submissions and public hearings” so that they can identify “the 
broad societal values on which the set of indicators should be based”. See also the discussion in Dasgupta (2000). Nordhaus (2002) is a 
recent proposal on how to incorporate improvements in health status. 
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correlate well with variables that are associated with physical manifestations of true internal happiness, 
such as smiling or electronic readings of the part of the brain that governs positive emotions.
7 Although 
subjective data have been used extensively in some fields in economics, such as contingent valuation 
studies, happiness data requires only a minimum of information processing and understanding of the 
workings of the economy (see Diamond and Hausman (1994) for a criticism of the kind of subjective 
data used in contingent valuation studies). 
 
Following Easterlin’s paper, a small happiness literature has emerged in economics.
8 The literature on 
the relationship between income and happiness includes (besides the papers cited above) Winkelman 
and Winkelman (1998) who use individual panel data for Germany, Di Tella et al (1997) who look at the 
evidence on changes in income across a panel of 12 OECD countries and Gardner and Oswald (2001) 
who use data on lottery winners. Happiness data have also been used to investigate a number of other 
outstanding issues in economics, including the costs of falling unemployed (Clark and Oswald (1994)), 
the role of democratic institutions (Frey and Stutzer (2000)), the structure of individual preferences 
(Konow and Early (1999), Luttmer (2004)), the inflation-unemployment trade-off (Di Tella et al (2001)), 
macroeconomic volatility (Wolfers (2002)), entrepreneurship (Blanchflower and Oswald (1998)), the 
environmnent (ch.11 in van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004)), partisan versus opportunistic models 
(Di Tella and MacCulloch (1998)), inequality (Alesina et al (2001), Graham and Pettinato (2002)), public 
policy on addiction (Gruber and Mullainathan (2002)) and the role of social norms and social capital 
(Luttmer (2004), Stutzer and Lalive (2000), Helliwell (2002)). See Frey and Stutzer (2002) for a review. 
 
The strategy for this paper, in a nutshell, consists of focusing on the components of individual 
preferences as they appear in a standard textbook formulation. These include income, the variability of 
income, effort when working, leisure, the quality of leisure and the expected time horizon. We then find 
empirical proxies for these forces and see how the relationship between income and happiness fares 
after controlling for these other plausible correlates of happiness. We then estimate the part of the 
 
7 On electroencephalogram measures of prefrontal brain activity, see Sutton and Davidson (1997). On heart rate and blood 
pressure measures of responses to stress see Shedler, et al (1993). Di Tella, et al (1997) show that micro-happiness regressions 
(where well-being answers are regressed on personal characteristics of respondents) have a similar structure across a number 
of nations. This is an unlikely outcome if the data contained no information. For more on validation, see Section 3. 
8 Argyle (1987), chapter 5, discusses the vast psychological literature on income and happiness. For references to the large 
literature on subjective well-being in psychology and political science, the reader is referred to Diener and Suh (2000), 
Veenhoven (1988, 1998), Inglehart (1990), Lane (2002), inter alia..   5
change over time in reported happiness that can be accounted for by changes in each variable. We are 
able to see which variable has made the biggest contribution to happiness over this period. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data set, the basic theory and the 
empirical strategy. Section 3 has two parts. In section 3.1 we present our basic set of results on the 
determinants of happiness, while section 3.2 uses these estimates and the actual changes in the variables 
under study to account for the changes in happiness across Europe and the US over the 23-year period 
covered in our sample. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Data, Theory and Empirical Strategy 
 
2.1. Well-Being Data 
The use of subjective data implies a departure from traditional economics, where individual preferences 
are inferred by choices made rather than vague notions of how people say they feel or what they say 
they want. The principle is made explicit in the work on revealed preference (Samuelson (1948)). A 
relatively recent development is the interest in data on people's opinions regarding some variable of 
interest. Perhaps the most convincing work deals with the taste for redistribution (see Luttmer (2001) 
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)) and the study of motivation (Frey, Oberholzer-Gee and 
Eichenberger (1996)). This approach relies on the individual's ability to formulate an opinion on the 
topic being asked. For example, if they are asked about cuts in the welfare state they are assumed to be 
able to form an intelligent opinion on the subject that incorporates all the relevant information, such as 
the tax gains and insurance losses that arise or any improvements in the unemployment rate that can 
occur. In fact, the use of this kind of data for valuation of the environment has been criticized precisely 
on these grounds (see, for example, Diamond and Hausman (1994), and the discussion on the 
environment in section 3.1 below).  
 
An approach that reduces the informational and computational burden on the individual is to simply 
ask them a well-being question and then correlate the answers with changes in the variable of interest. 
For example, in order to investigate the benefits of, say, the welfare state, the approach consists of 
asking individuals if they are happy and then see if this correlates with changes in some parameter 
measuring the generosity of the welfare state. This relies only on the ability of individuals to evaluate 
their own level of happiness with some precision. Psychologists, who have worked with these data have   6
provided an array of evidence showing that well-being data are correlated with physical reactions that 
are associated with true happiness. These include Pavot (1991) and Eckman, Davidson and Friesen 
(1990) who find that individuals reporting to be very happy tend to smile more (i.e. the duration of so-
called “Duchenne smiles”). Shedler et al (1993) show that happiness data are negatively correlated with 
heart rate and blood pressure measures of responses to stress and Sutton and Davidson (1997) show 
that happiness data are positively correlated with electroencephalogram measures of prefrontal brain 
activity (the part of the brain that is associated with optimism and other positive states of mind). Lastly, 
average happiness level within countries seem to be negatively correlated with suicide rates, an event 
that presumably expresses true internal unhappiness (see Di Tella et al (1997)). 
 
Konow and Early (1999) discuss a number of other studies that are helpful in assessing the validity of 
well-being data, some of them based on correlating the data with other subjective data. Seidlitz et al 
(1997), for example, show that happiness data correlate well with subject recall of positive life events. 
Diener (1984) and Sandvik, et al (1993) have shown that the data are correlated with reports of friends 
and family members on the subject's level of well-being.  
 
A potential problem with all subjective data is framing, the fact that sometimes what appear to be 
similar questions elicit different answers depending on the way they are asked. The validation exercises 
described above seem to indicate that the framing problem with happiness data appears to be small. 
Furthermore, Fordyce (1988) shows that the different measures of well-being correlate well with one 
another, something that has also been later confirmed by Konow and Early (1999) with experimental 
data, by Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) for data from the UK and the US and by Di Tella et al (1997) 
for data from 12 OECD countries. 
 
The psychology literature has also considered the possibility that subjects are influenced by what they 
believe to be the socially desirable response when they answer surveys. If the social norm is to be 
happy, subjects may bias their response upwards. Since the first studies in the area, psychologists have 
found evidence pointing out that this concern may be exaggerated (e.g., Rorer (1965), Bradburn (1969)). 
Konow and Early (1999) present experimental evidence showing that the Marlowe-Crowne measure of 
social desirability is uncorrelated with happiness data.  
   7
A different approach to study the validity of happiness data is taken in Di Tella et al. (1997). They 
present micro-econometric happiness and life satisfaction regressions for 12 European countries and 
the US. These regress the well-being answers on a set of personal characteristics, including age, sex, 
education, employment status, income, and marital status. They show that these equations share a 
similar structure across countries, an unlikely event if the data contained no information. 
 
2.2. Data Sources 
Our main data source is the Euro-Barometer Survey Series (1975-1997), which interviews a random 
sample of Europeans during the 23-year period covering 1975-97 and asks a series of socio-economic 
questions. The main question of interest asks: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?” (The small “Don't know” and “No answer” categories are 
not studied here). Data are available on this question for just under half a million people (or 481,712 
observation to be precise). However this reduces to 344,294 observations for which a complete set of 
data on a large number of personal characteristics, which are needed for our subsequent tests, is also 
available. Another well-being question asking respondents simply how happy they are is also available 
from the Euro-Barometer, but is only asked for a shorter time period, 1975-86. “Happiness” and “life 
satisfaction” are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.56 for the period 1975-86) and 
previous work has found that very similar conclusions can be reached with both data sets. In fact, the 
life satisfaction question was included in the survey in part because the word “happy” translated 
imprecisely across languages.  
 
Well-being data for the U.S. comes from the United States General Social Survey (GSS, 1972-2000). 
There is no “life satisfaction” question available. Instead, there is a “happiness” question that reads, 
“Taken all together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or 
not too happy?” (Small “Don't know” and “No answer” categories are not studied here).  This was asked 
in each of 18 years between 1975 and 1997 (in some years no GSS was conducted) and we use the 
responses of 26,855 individuals. In order to include the U.S. data into a data set that also contains the 
Euro-Barometer data we converted the European answers into three categories by merging the answers 
in the bottom two categories (“not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied”). We tried a second method, 
where we assumed simply that were a 4
th additional happiness category offered in the U.S. it would have 
been empty. This resembles closely the actual distribution of answers in Europe, in which only 4.8 
percent of people chose the bottom category. The two methods yield similar conclusions. Our results are also robust to using the original four categories for Europe and excluding the U.S. from our sample. 
Tables A-E describe the U.S., GSS and Euro-Barometer Survey Series in greater detail. 
 
Table A reports the basic time series of our happiness data for Europe and the United States. The data 
seem to point in the direction of general happiness, as most people are satisfied with the life they lead. 
However Table B shows that there are large underlying cross sectional differences once the data are 
partitioned on employment status and income quartile of respondents. Table C reports basic summary 
statistics for the aggregate variables, including measures of both between and within group variation. 
Some of these variables contain trends. Table D reports the partial correlation coefficients between the 
aggregate variables, controlling for country and year fixed effects. Summary statistics across the 
personal characteristics used in the subsequent regressions are reported in Table E. 
 
2.3. Theory and Empirical Strategy 
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This is the standard assumption that individuals care about the expected utility over their lifetime, 
where for simplicity only two states are considered, employed and unemployed. Since our empirical 
implementation is motivated by (1), we describe it in detail (see the Appendix for the definition and 
sources of the variables mentioned below).  First, note that T, the number of years people expect to live 
enters explicitly into individual preferences at time, t.
9 Empirically, we allow for individual happiness 
levels to vary with the country's life expectancy (Life Expectancy) and with individual age (Age). Second, a 
standard approach assumes that individuals are affected by a parameter θt denoting general conditions 
that affect well-being, such as those affecting the environment or health (see Murphy and Topel 
(1999)). Empirically, we attempt to capture this by the country's level of total sulphur oxide emissions 
in kilograms per capita (called SOx Emissions). Another possibility for capturing θ often suggested in 
 
9 An open question in the happiness literature is that individuals may be appealing to two related but different notions of 
well-being when they answer, namely their instantaneous happiness or their lifetime expected utility. If it is the former, one 
would expect variables that should be affect individuals in the future (such as Life Expectancy) to play a less important role.   9
opinion polls is that individuals are more stressed when the amount of crime in society (Crime) is high. 
The inclusion of crime is also justified by the presence of T in equation (1). 
 
Individual utility is assumed to depend on the usual two arguments, income and leisure. Employed 
individuals derive income wt, from work and receive benefits bt when unemployed. We proxy the latter 
by  Benefits, the parameters of the unemployment benefit system as summarized by the OECD. 
Individuals are assumed to have to carry nominal money balances for transactions purposes, something 
that is negatively affected by the level of inflation (Inflation). Individual net income can be decomposed 
into each person’s position relative to the mean (Personal Income Position) and the country mean (GDP per 
Capita). This allows us to distinguish the effect of an increase in income relative to the rest of the 
population (status or relative income effects), from the effects of a general increase in income in the 
population. In summary, an individual’s income can be expressed as rit GDPt so that applying logarithms 
we get log rit + log GDPt (the two terms included in our regression). We also include a change in 
income term proxied by the growth rate of the economy (GDP Growth). Relative income and adaptation 
are the two main alternative hypothesis to explain the Easterlin paradox besides omitted variables. 
 
The effect of leisure on utility is assumed to depend on the quantity of leisure, lt, and its quality, qt. 
Empirically, the quantity of leisure is proxied by (the inverse of) the annual average of hours worked in 
the country (Hours Worked). It's hard to think of convincing proxies for the quality of leisure given the 
enormous variation in the way individuals spend their free time. We assume, however, that most people 
value being part of a strong and cohesive family. One possible way to capture this effect is by including 
the rate of divorce in each country (Divorce) and individual controls for being married (Marital Status) 
and for the number of children (Children). Second, it is likely that individuals who have retired have 
more time for leisure than employed individuals, leading us to include indicators for retired status 
(Retired). A third approach to capture the quality of leisure is by including information on the 
characteristics of the place where individuals live, such as the size of their city of residence (Size of 
Community). Big cities, on the one hand, are expected to have more amenities, such as cinemas and 
restaurants, which are expected to increase the quality of leisure time. On the other hand, cities may be 
crowded, commuting time is often long and scenic views and other natural amenities are scarcer. 
 
Finally, individual preferences as described in (1) posit that uncertainty is an important component of 
well-being. Forward-looking individuals know that with some probability, denoted by 1-et in equation (1), they will be unemployed. The costs of falling unemployed depend on the income received while 
unemployed (Benefits) and the expected duration of unemployment spells. The latter depends on (and is 
proxied by) the unemployment rate (Unemployment Rate). Equation (1) also allows for the non-economic 
costs of falling unemployed, such as emotional distress and any change in future expectations due to 
updates in individual ability. Thus, we control for individual unemployment status (Unemployed). 
Likewise, certain types of employment have higher non-pecuniary returns; the self-employed being an 
obvious candidate as they have the benefit of not having a boss (Self Employed). We allow the probability 
of losing a job, 1-et, to depend on how good employment/income prospects are in the future, given by 
the degree of openness of the economy to external shocks (Openness). Finally, educated individuals are 
more easily re-hired, as witnessed by their lower unemployment rate. Accordingly, we include individual 
educational attainment (Education).  
 
In summary, we evaluate the relationship between happiness responses and a set of macroeconomic 
variables and as well as a set of personal characteristics of the respondents. The basic regression that we 
seek to estimate is of the form: 
 
ist t s ist ist st ist INTERACT MICRO MACRO HAPPINESS µ λ η δ β α + + + + + =     (2) 
 
where HAPPINESSist is the utility of individual i, who lives in country s, in year t. The vector MACROst 
refers to the set of variables aggregated at the country level that vary with each year in our sample 
(except otherwise noted). The vector MICROist refers to the set of personal characteristics of the 
respondents listed above. Finally, where possible we interact the macro-variable under study with 
personal characteristics that the theory predicts are important. This is denoted by INTERACTist, where 
an example is the interaction of SOx Emissions with the age of the respondent since there is a large 
literature suggesting that the young are especially hurt by environmental degradation. In these 
regressions a concern with omitted variable bias is reduced by our focus on the happiness of a group 
relative to that of another group. This approach uses the base group as a way to control for other 
aggregate shocks than the ones we are capturing with our macroeconomic controls (see Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (1998) and Gruber and Mullainathan (2002)). We also include a dummy variable for each 
country, ηs, a dummy for each year, λt, and an (i.i.d) error term, µist. We compute robust standard errors, 
where we correct for potential heteroscedasticity and for potential correlation of the error term across 
observations that are contained within a cross-sectional unit in any given year (see Moulton (1986)). 
  10  11
                                                
Estimation of equation (2) is constrained by the fact that we cannot directly observe the latent 
continuous variable, HAPPINESSist. We have data on the individual self-reported well-being from a 
“life satisfaction” question in Europe and a “happiness” question in the U.S. Since such proxies for 
each individual’s level of utility are based on data that give us only an ordinal ranking, we are unable to 
use  an Ordinary Least Squares regression. What we do observe are several discrete response outcomes 
that come from a well-being question like: “Are you Satisfied with the life you lead?”. From these, we can 
define the following dichotomous variables: Happy
1
ist=1 if the person responds “Not at all satisfied” and 0 
otherwise; Happy
2
ist=1 if the person responds “Not very satisfied” and 0 otherwise, Happy
3
ist=1 if the 
person responds “Fairly satisfied” and 0 otherwise; Happy
4
ist=1 if the person responds “Very satisfied” and 
0 otherwise. The ordered logit model that is consequently used to estimate equation (2) assumes that 
Happy
1
ist=1 if HAPPINESSist<c1; Happy
2
ist=1 if c1<HAPPINESSist<c2; Happy
3
ist=1 if c2<HAPPINESSist 
<c3; Happy
4
ist=1 if HAPPINESSist>c3 where c1, c2 and c3 are the thresholds that the latent variable must 





3.1 Empirical Results 
Our basic set of results is reported in Table 1. We include two specifications, one for Europe plus the 
United States and the other just for Europe. The latter are reported to ensure consistency across the 
wording of the well-being question (which refers to ‘Life Satisfaction’ in Europe but ‘Happiness’ in the US, 
as detailed in section 2). After discussing the sign and size of the effects of the variables of interest, we 
then undertake a ‘Happiness Accounting’ exercise. This entails calculating the total change in utility 
from the beginning to the end of our sample period (i.e., from 1975 to 1997) and then decomposing the 
change into its parts that derive from the changes in each of our explanatory variables. Table 1A 
presents some auxiliary regressions that include income inequality and government consumption. 
 
Income I: Levels 
A key component of utility is income, from which consumption is derived. As explained above, it is 
possible to express individual net income as the product of the individual's position relative to the 
 
10 For more discussion of the identification and specification issues arising from estimation of this kind of model, see Di 
Tella and MacCulloch (1998). 
   12
                                                
country mean times the country mean. Applying logs, we can express the logarithm of income as log rit 
+ log GDPt. These two terms are included in our regression (called Personal Income Position and GDP per 
Capita respectively). This is useful because it allows us to distinguish the effect of an increase in income 
that takes place in the context of a general increase in income in the population, from an increase in 
income relative to the rest of the population. 
  
Both the personal income position and the level of absolute income seem to matter, as both 
coefficients are positive and significant at conventional levels. Interestingly, we cannot reject equality of 
the coefficients (both are approximately equal to 0.5). This means that we can reject the hypothesis that 
relative income matters, at least in the sense that it means something more than just a concern for 
income.
11 If we repeat exactly the same specification as in column (1) but with the two dimensions of 
income variation combined into a single measure of a person’s absolute level of income given by log yit 
(where log yit = log GDPt + log rit) then we can get a rough feel for the absolute size of the effect of an 
increase in income on happiness. If a person on the mean level of income experiences an increase in 
their income by 5 percent then he or she should also be approximately 1 percentage point more likely 
to declare him/herself as being in the top happiness category. 
 
Finally, we experimented with a linear measure and including a squared term (i.e., by the inclusion of yit 
and its square).
12 The results show a strong positive effect of the linear term and negative effect of the 
squared term. Using the specification in column (1) of Table 1 the coefficient on the linear term is 5.4e-
5 (t-stat=20.1) and on the squared term is -7.0e-10 (t-stat=-12.4).  
 
Income II: GDP Growth 
Changes in income may affect happiness beyond a level effect. The effect of higher income may be 
only temporary as individuals gradually adapt to their better standard of living, leading to differential 
short and long-run effects. Also, expectations for the future should affect present levels of well-being. 
A simple indicator of how bright or bleak the future looks, both in terms of likely employment status as 
 
11 This is so because a finding that α and β have similar size in the regression, HAPPINESSit = α log rit + β log GDPt + εit 
suggests that HAPPINESSit = α log yit + εit is a sufficient description of the role of income in preferences (since log yit =log 
rit + log GDPt). This conclusion is subject to the usual constraints arising from using low precision personal income data 
derived from surveys, making measurement error issues non-trivial. 
12 Throughout the paper we report the results using variations in the basic specifications to deal with hypotheses that have 
been suggested in the literature. We do not include the tables but all results are available upon request.   13
                                                
well as income, is provided by the rate of growth of the economy. The results show, as expected, a 
positive and significant effect of GDP Growth. We can estimate the size of these effects in terms of 
individual income. A 1-percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate (say from 2 to 3 percentage 
points per annum) is equivalent to increasing an individual’s present level of income by 2.4 percent.
13 
Looking at the size of the effect a different way, an increase in GDP Growth of 3 percentage points is 
predicted to move 1 extra percentage point of the population up to the top happiness category.
14
 
It is often claimed effect that some people are more likely to be affected by the opportunities presented 
by economic growth. The group that should be especially affected is the group of employed workers 
whose incomes may rise. We can test for this effect by interacting GDP Growth with an employment 
dummy, whose coefficient turns out positive and significant, at the 5 per cent level. The sub-group of 
employed who may be expected to benefit the most from higher growth in the economy are the self-
employed. This is also where our data show the biggest (positive) effects on happiness of economic 
growth to be concentrated. When an interaction is included, the coefficient on Self-Employed equals 
0.003 (statistically insignificant) while the interaction of the Self-Employed dummy with GDP Growth 
equals 1.31 (significant at the 1 per cent level). As a reference note that the coefficient on being 
divorced is equal to -0.24 (as most coefficients presented in Table 1 remain largely unchanged). 
 
Life Expectancy 
Unless there is infinite discounting, individuals care about the number of years they expect to live. 
Economists have devised a variety of approaches to derive the value of a life. A simple and persuasive 
approach was taken in Thaler and Rosen (1975), based on the theory of compensating differentials. 
Since jobs that carry a higher risk of losing your life have higher wages, they were able to derive an 
implicit value of a life, as derived by individual employment choices in the free market, at approximately 
$175,000 in 1967. In 2000 dollars this equals approximately $772,000.
15 In general, more recent 
estimates have been higher. For example, using consumption activities that affect risk and hypothetical 
markets yields valuations of a life that range around $1-9 million (see Blomquist (2001); for a general 
 
13 This calculation is made as follows. A 1 percentage point higher growth rate is equivalent to a 2.4 percent rise in one’s 
Personal Income Position since 0.46*log(1.024)≈1.1*0.01. 
14 Since 0.01=Φ(-39.4+0.03*1.1-(-38.7))-Φ(-39.4-(-38.7)) where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution, the top cut point of 
the ordered probit regression in column (1) of Table 1A equals -38.7 and the mean score is -39.4. 
15 Since (GDP deflator in 2000)/(GDP deflator in 1967) = 4.41.   14
                                                
review, see Viscusi (1993)).
16 Valuing life is also an important aspect of work that values medical 
research (see, for example, Murphy and Topel (1999) and Cutler and McClellan (2001)). 
 
As in previous work, happiness is u-shaped in age (e.g. Clark, Oswald (1994)). Importantly, we find a 
positive coefficient on Life Expectancy in columns (1) and (2), both significant at the 12% level. Care 
should be exercised when interpreting this coefficient for two reasons. First, life expectancy may be 
correlated with health conditions. Second, we tried a similar specification but control for some other 
plausible determinants of happiness (such as income inequality) then the size of the coefficient on Life 
Expectancy increases by almost 50-percent and becomes significant at the 3 percent level. These results 
are reported in Table 1A in the appendix. Using the coefficients in Table 1, we can put a dollar value on 
the size of these effects. One more year of life is equivalent to an increase in the level of GDP per 
capita of 7 percentage points (=exp(0.032/0.5)-1). In the United States, where GDP per capita was 
equal to $24,849 this is equivalent to valuing an extra life-year at $1,790 (in 1990 values). In 2000 dollars 
it equals $2,240. In other words, a person who expects to live one year longer due to a reduction in the 
risk of death is willing to pay $2,240 in annual income in exchange. (This compares with a value of 
$3,000 in annual income calculated by Murphy and Topel (1999) for a 30 year old, corresponding to a 
total value over their remaining life of about $150,000). Auxiliary regressions suggest that the positive 
effect of longer life expectancy is weaker for older people, as in Murphy and Topel (to the extent that 
longer life expectancies have been associated with higher survival rates).
17 In terms of the 
unemployment rate, denying an individual one year of life expectancy has an equivalent cost to 
increasing the unemployment rate by 1.1 percentage point (=1*0.032/2.8).  
 
The Environment and Pollution 
Environmental degradation can have adverse effects on individual utility. Previous work has 
emphasized effects on human health and the destruction of natural resources. In this paper we focus on 
sulphur oxide emissions measured in kg per capita (SOx), a type of pollutant with non-local effects that 
 
16 Policymakers must regularly use estimates of how much is a human life worth. Viscusi (2002) explains that amongst 
government agencies, the Federal Aviation Authority places the lowest value on a human life ($3 million), while the 
Environmental Protection Agency uses the highest figures (up to $88 million). In February 2002, for example, the United 
States (EPA) used an estimate of $4.8 million in 1990 dollars for a life (see Guidelines for Preparing Economic analyses.) 
17 Murphy and Topel (1999) indicate “that increases in life expectancy are worth more when survival rates are higher. This is perhaps our 
most interesting result and has many implications. It accounts for the relatively low value placed on even large reductions in death rates at very old 
ages. At old ages the expected remaining length of life is so low that marginal increases in life have relatively low value”. Improvements in life 
expectancy in their model have their greatest values at around age 40 years for women and between 40 to 55 years old for 
men (see pp 20-21).    15
                                                
is the focal point of most acid-rain legislation.
18 We concentrate on SOx emissions as this type of 
pollution has been a central preoccupation of policymakers and there is readily available data going 
back two decades. Economic methods for measuring the value of the environment that depend on 
observed behavior, such as those based on hedonic property values or travel costs, have somewhat 
limited scope. Methods based on hypothetical variations, namely contingent valuation studies based on 
surveys, have thus been the main approach in the literature (Hanemann (1994) provides a survey; see 
also the collection of papers in Stavins (2000)). A serious concern with these studies is the classic 
problem of question framing and that respondents may bias their answers to influence their preferred 
outcome (this is sometimes called strategic bias).
19
 
Our approach based on happiness data suggests that the level of SOx emissions has an adverse effect 
on reported well-being in regression (1) of Table 1, significant at the 1 per cent level. A one standard 
deviation increase in SOx emissions, equal to a rise of 23 kg per capita, has a decrease on well-being 
equivalent to a 15 percent drop in the level of GDP per capita (=exp(23*0.003/0.5)-1). This is also 
equivalent to 40 percent of a one standard deviation change of GDP per capita across the sample. Since 
the drop in SOx emissions in the United States (as well as most other leading industrialized nations) has 
been similar to the above magnitude (from 100kg per capita in 1975 down to 70kg in 1997 for the US) 
these numbers suggest there are substantial corresponding gains to average well-being. Note that this is 
over and above any health effects captured in life expectancy. 
 
The literature suggests that the negative effects of a bad environment are felt more by the young than 
the old, and by the rich rather than the poor. When the interaction term, SOx Emissions*Age, is included 
in the specification in column (1), the coefficient on SOx Emissions becomes more negative whereas the 
interaction term is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. Its size indicates that the negative 
effect of SOx emissions on the happiness of a 20 year old is more than twice the size of the effect on a 
70 year old (i.e., -0.038 for the former compared to -0.018 for the latter). As for income, the negative 
 
18 SOx is widely considered the best single proxy for local and non-local effects. Coal powered electricity generating plants 
produce most SOx (and about ½ of NOx gasses). This type of gas is related to the first recorded event of pollution-related 
deaths –the 1952 London smog that led to more than 12,000 deaths. For an interesting study of the environment (noise) 
using happiness data, see van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004). 
19 Tietenberg (2000) lists two other types of bias present in such studies: that occurring when respondents are asked to value 
attributes with which they have little experience (information bias), and the bias introduced by respondents who treat a 
hypothetical survey in a casual manner (hypothetical bias). Diamond and Hausman (1994) describe these and other 
problems with these studies and conclude, “contingent valuation is a deeply flawed methodology for measuring nonuse values, one that does 
not estimate what its proponents claim to be estimating” p. 62.   16
effect is also concentrated in those countries that have a high level of income. The interaction term, 
SOx*GDP per Capita, is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. For example, in Spain in 1990 
where average per capita income was equal to $12,662 (in 1990 dollars) there was no effect of SO 
emissions on happiness. However in that year in the US where per capita income was equal to $22,224 
(in 1990 dollars) there was a significant negative effect of SOx emissions on happiness that was 1.6 
times bigger than the average effect measured across the whole sample of countries (i.e. -0.005 
compared to -0.003). The effect is also more negative for richer individuals. For example, the 
coefficient on SOx Emissionsst*log yist is equal to -0.00095 (significant at the 5 percent level), while that on 
SOx Emissionsst equals 0.0065 (statistically insignificant) and on log yist is 0.5 (comfortably significant). 
This suggests that for the individual on highest income in our sample ($49,724), the effect of a one 
standard deviation increase in pollution (23kg/capita) is equivalent to a 17 percent reduction in income 
(since log(1-0.17)≅23*(0.0065-0.00095*10.8)/0.5 where 10.8=log(49724)). 
 
Unemployment Rate 
Individuals may care about the unemployment rate as this is an indicator of the employment risk that 
they run, as well as the length of time they expect to be unemployed if in effect they do fall 
unemployed. Here, as well as in the next section on inflation, we keep the discussion short as Di Tella et 
al (1997, 2001) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (1998) already discuss some of these effects and the 
related literature. As column (1) shows, being unemployed rather than employed has as bad an effect on 
happiness as being divorced or separated (rather than married). More precisely, becoming unemployed 
reduces happiness by 1.3 times the amount due to going from married to divorced (=0.49/(0.14+0.24)) 
and by 1.04 times the amount due to going from married to separated (=0.49/(0.14+0.33)).  
 
Unemployment affects a fairly small number of people at any one time, so that a higher unemployment 
rate has a fairly small direct effect on the average level of happiness. A standard description of 
preferences as given in equation (1) suggests that unemployment may have a much bigger indirect effect, 
through an increased sense of ‘fear’ at losing one’s job, spread throughout the whole population (see 
Blanchflower (1991) for survey evidence). This increased sense of insecurity has been well documented 
(OECD 1997). The effect of a 1 percentage point rise in the unemployment rate has the same effect on 
happiness as a drop in GDP of 5.7 percentage points (=exp(0.01*2.8/0.5)-1). This rises to 6.8 
percentage points once the personal costs of unemployment are added. (=exp(0.01*(2.8+0.5)/0.5)-1). 
   17
In order to probe further into this channel we focused on the groups that should be less vulnerable to 
high rates of unemployment, namely the retired and those studying at school. For these two groups, the 
unemployment rate has a less negative effect than for those in the labor force. More formally, the 
interaction term on Retired*Unemployment Rate is positive and significant at the 5-percent level (equal to 
0.60) and the coefficient on In School*Unemployment Rate is also positive and significant at the 5 percent 
level (equal to 0.75). There is also some (weak) evidence that a higher rate of unemployment further 
decreases the happiness of an individual who is presently unemployed (the interaction term is negative, 
quantitatively large, and significant at the 17 percent level). Higher unemployment may increase the 
expected duration of the unemployment spell for someone who is currently out of work, although this 
effect may be offset by unemployment becoming less of a stigma. 
 
Inflation Rate 
The literature has found it difficult to isolate the theoretical reasons behind the public’s strong aversion 
to inflation, at least as reported in public opinion polls. Some have argued that inflation is positively 
associated with relative price oscillations, and that this increases uncertainty. Some have argued that 
inflation may reduce the ability to save, including holding real money balances, as some instruments 
may not be fully indexed. Individuals living on fixed income, such as the retired may be particularly 
affected. Others have argued that inflation may not be fully anticipated, so that reductions in the real 
incomes may result. 
 
According to column (1), a one-percentage point rise in the level of inflation reduces happiness by as 
much as a 0.3 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate (=0.01*0.8/2.8). This calculation 
ignores the personal costs of unemployment incurred by those people who actually lose their jobs. 
Adding in these costs implies a smaller increase in unemployment of 0.2 percentage points 
(=0.01*0.8/(2.8+0.5)). 
  
We also tested for whether high inflation affected different groups differently. For example, the earlier 
discussion suggested that the retired may find inflation particularly difficult to cope with. There is no 
strong evidence that this group is affected worse by inflation, compared to the employed, since inflation 
interacted with Retired yields a negative but insignificant coefficient (equal to -0.2 with a t-stat of -1.0). 
However those people with a relatively high Personal Income Position are affected less negatively than 
those on low incomes in their country, possibly due to less reliance on fixed incomes. The coefficient   18
on Inflation rate*Personal Income Position equals 0.61 and the coefficient on the Inflation rate equals -0.76. 
Hence a rise from the bottom to the top of the income scale in a country changes the marginal cost of a 
higher inflation rate from -1.1 to -0.38 (=-0.76-0.61*0.62 to -0.76+ 0.61*0.62, respectively since the 
range of log rit is -0.62 to 0.62). 
 
Unemployment Benefits 
A standard assumption in economics is that individuals prefer to smooth income. The presence of a 
system paying out benefits to the unemployed may allow them to do so more easily than in its absence. 
The unemployed are expected to have a special appreciation for benefits, but the employed who 
understand that they may also gain from the system in the future should also experience some welfare 
improvement from having the system in place. Models of the determination of unemployment benefits 
show how they trade off the benefits of more insurance with the tax costs of more generous systems, as 
well as the incentive costs in terms of higher unemployment (see, for example, Wright (1986)). The 
desirability of a more generous system of unemployment benefits can be expected to be higher at a time 
of more employment volatility, something that suggests a line of causality going from unemployment 
risks to benefits.  
 
Table 1 shows that, keeping the unemployment rate, income, and individual employment status 
constant, more generous unemployment benefits increase happiness. One can calculate how much 
benefits should increase to compensate people for an increase in the unemployment rate. For example, 
if the unemployment rate increased by 1 percentage point then a rise in the level of benefit replacement 
rate of 4 percentage points would be sufficient to keep happiness constant (=0.01*2.8/0.7). This is 
equivalent to an increase in the level of benefit generosity from the Irish level of 0.28 to the French 
level of 0.32. Alternatively, a drop in the replacement rate of 1 percentage point would need to be 
compensated by a 1.6 percent increase in GDP per Capita in order to keep well-being the same 
(=exp(0.01*0.7/0.5)-1). 
 
The evidence suggests that the main group who gain from higher unemployment benefits, in terms of 
happiness, is that of people with the lowest level of education in the sample (i.e. up to 15 years old). 
The coefficient on Benefits is 8 per cent larger for the lowest educated than the coefficient on Benefits for 
the respondents with the next highest level of education (although this effect is only significant at the 
13 percent level). The self-employed enjoy a significantly lower level of happiness when unemployment   19
benefits are high than other groups (at the 5 percent level) although the size of the effect is 
quantitatively small (the coefficient on Benefits is 0.6 for the self-employed and 0.7 for the rest of the 
sample). The reason could be that they are more self-reliant on informal insurance arrangements than 
others, despite possibly facing a higher risk of losing their jobs (see also the section on GDP Growth 
where the self-employed are found to be more affected by changes in the growth rate). 
 
Crime Rate 
Opinion polls show that people regularly rank crime as one of their main preoccupations. At the very 
least, crime against property introduces variations in income when insurance is not complete while 
living in fear of crime reduces the enjoyment of leisure time, as well as introduce a concern for the 
safety of family and friends while at work. Although rich households may invest in observable crime-
deterring devices, they may also be more desirable targets. Becker (1968) originally argued that one 
could define a “demand for crime” by showing that potential victims can affect the marginal returns to 
offenders by changing their behavior (buying locks, altering traveling patterns, etc). 
 
We study the effect of the subcategory of crime given by serious (violent) assault. Increases in this type 
of crime reduce happiness. For example, the rise in violent crime from 242 to 388 assaults per 100,000 
people in the United States (i.e. a 60 percent rise) during our sample period would be equivalent to a 
drop of approximately 3.5 percent in GDP per Capita (or approximately 0.029*0.6/0.5 since both these 
variables are measured in logs), other things equal.  
 
One’s personal circumstances may also play a role since those who are not married with a family and 
who don’t live with others may feel the most insecure. As noted above, the effect of personal income 
on exposure to crime appears ambiguous. We are able to test for some of the effects outlined in the 
theoretical work by interacting Crime with Personal Income Position, as well as with Age and whether the 
respondent is married or living as married rather than being single (although we do not know for sure 
whether the single people in our sample are living alone or in short relationships). Being in a lower or 
higher income group does not have a significant differential effect on the unhappiness that one 
experiences from more crime. Being older weakly offsets some of the adverse impact of crime (but only 
at the 16 percent level of significance). For those people who are married or in a defacto relationship, 
higher crime rates do have a significantly less negative impact on their happiness compared to single 
people (at the 1 percent level).   20
                                                
Divorce Rate 
Psychologists have emphasized that a dense network of family and friends can lead to a more fulfilling 
life (see Myers (1999) for a discussion). Beyond this, a network of family and friends may provide some 
forms of insurance.
20 Becker (1974) provides a discussion of how marriage may affect equilibrium 
incomes for the partners through changes in leisure and “power”. There is a public debate concerning 
the break up of families and the substitution of family life for work. If the divorce rate is a good 
indicator of these type of problems there is indeed source of concern as divorce rates have increased 
quite drastically in some of the countries in our sample. 
 
Our study treats this issue differently than previous studies by controlling for marital status as well as 
including a variable, called Divorce Rate, the number of divorces per 1,000 people, which attempts to 
measure family instability in society. Its coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 per cent level. To 
get an idea of the size of these effects, in France the divorce rate has risen from 1.2 per 1,000 people in 
1975 to 2 per 1,000 people in 1997. This increase in family instability over the past quarter century has 
“cost” the country, in monetary equivalent terms, 10 percentage points of GDP per capita 
(=exp(0.8*0.056/0.46)-1). It is also equivalent to a rise in the unemployment rate of 1.6 percentage 
points (=0.8*0.056/2.8). These costs are in additional to the high (continuing) costs to those individuals 
who remain divorced. 
 
For those people who declare themselves divorced at the time of the survey, their drop in well-being is 
half the magnitude of the drop experienced by falling unemployed (the coefficients on Divorced and 
Unemployed are -0.24 and -0.49, respectively). The division of work in the household may depend on the 
social and legal acceptability of divorce as this may affect the bargaining power of each member. A 
small literature has studied this aspect of marriage (see, for example, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix 
(2001), Stevenson and Wolfers (2001), inter alia). By interacting a year time trend with a dummy 
reflecting whether the respondent is a married woman, we can check if marriage has become more 
beneficial to women, something that is expected if their bargaining power has improved. The 
interaction term turns out positive and significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that women have 
been becoming happier in marriage. The effect is quantitatively large. The amount of this improvement 
is equivalent to moving up from the bottom to the middle category of Education. Married women are, 
 
20 For exchange (i.e. not based on altruism) models of family insurance, see Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), inter alia.   21
however, unhappier on average than married men and the gain in happiness from being married has, on 
average for both men and women, been declining between 1975 and 1997. The happiness gap between 
men and women has also been falling over this period. 
 
Working Hours 
Leisure is a positive argument of the utility function. Becker (1965), for example, argued that resources 
had to be measured by what he calls “full income” which is the sum of money income and the income 
lost by the use of time in the pursuit of utility. Empirically, this seems to be an important modification 
to standard measures of GDP, as there are large variations in the number of working hours, both across 
countries and within countries over the last 20 years. In the US for example, Hammermesh and Rees 
(1993) report that the average full-time hours of work per week in manufacturing in the US in 1900 was 
55, whereas in 1990 it was 37. More recent time series show increases in hours worked in the US, as 
well as decreases in other OECD countries (notably France). In the conventional GNP measurement, 
commuting to work is given a positive value. This is clearly a shortcoming and Nordhaus and Tobin 
(1973) propose that GNP be corrected to measure this as a welfare loss. The correction for hours 
worked is particularly important given the possibility, raised by a number of authors, that people may 
be working "too much" in capitalist economies (see Akerlof (1976), Schor (1992), Hamermesh and 
Slemrod (2004), inter alia). 
 
Hours Worked has a significant and negative effect on happiness. Both this variable, as well as GDP per 
Capita, are measured in logarithms so the estimates suggest that a 1 percent increase in working hours 
would have to be compensated by a 2.4 percent rise in GDP per Capita (≈0.01*1.2/0.5). This is related 
to measuring the marginal rate of substitution between work and leisure. Whilst Americans are working 
harder than before, Europe has experienced the opposite trend. We are able to calculate which group 
has done better in terms of well-being. Annual hours of work declined in France from 1,865 hours in 
1975 down to 1,605 hours in 1997. Over the same period annual working hours rose in American from 
1,890 up to 1,966 hours. In other words, whereas hours worked fell by 260 in France they increased by 
76 in America. Has this widening of the gap by 336 hours been worth it for Americans? It corresponds 
to 18% of the mean number of annual hours worked for Americans in 1975 (=336/1890). The 
monetary compensation required is a rise in the level of GDP per capita equal to 49 percent (since 
ln1.49=1.2/0.5*ln1.18). Since GDP per capita rose by 46 per cent in the United States between 1975 
and 1997 ($17,000 to $24,849) this increase in wealth would have approximately compensated   22
                                                
Americans for their longer working hours provided there had not been any such comparable increase in 
French GDP per capita. However incomes in France increased by 42 per cent over the same period (i.e. 
from $15,738 to $22,308). Consequently these results suggest that the higher incomes of Americans 
compared to the French have not been sufficient to compensate for the longer working hours in 
happiness terms. We can calculate the increase in GDP per capita required in America to match the rise 
in happiness in France arising from their shorter working hours and higher GDP per capita between 
1975 and 1997. The increase in American GDP per capita that would have been needed equals 124 
percent of the level in 1975 (since 0.5ln(1+1.24)-1.2ln(1966/1890)=0.5ln(1+0.42)-1.2ln(1605/1865). 
Hence the shortfall in American GDP compared to the level in France amounts to approximately 78 
per cent of 1975 GDP per capita (=1.24-0.46), or approximately $13,260 in 1990 dollar values. 
 
We can also try and see where the effects of longer working hours are concentrated. As may be 
expected, the employed are the ones who experience a significantly larger decrease in happiness due to 
longer working hours compared to those who are not working (i.e. the unemployed, retired, at home 
and in school). The fact that there remain negative effects even for some of the groups who are not 
employed suggests that, for example, the person keeping the house may also suffer a loss of happiness 
due to more hours at work of other family members. (The negative effect of Hours Worked on 
happiness is 50-percent larger for those actually employed compared to those who are not). One 
exception to the adverse effect of longer working hours comes from the self-employed group, who 
experience no significant happiness drop from the changes to more time spent working. 
 
Openness 
We attempt to capture the variability of income in the economy, something that appears as quite 
important in the basic specification of preferences. Indeed, we have so far controlled for income and, 
to some extent, for variations in employment status through the inclusion of the unemployment rate, 
but for little else on this front. A very rough and basic measure of the exposure of the economy to 
external shocks is Openness, the sum of imports and exports over GDP.
21 Again, note that any presumed 
effect of openness to trade on income (for example, through more efficient use of resources) has been 
taken into account in the income effect. Controlling for country and year fixed effects, we can see from 
 
21 The literature on the determinants of the welfare state uses Openness for similar purposes. For example, Rodrik (1998) uses 
it to see if countries with greater exposure to foreign shocks make larger welfare payments and hence have bigger 
governments. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) use it to study the determinants of the parameters of the UI system.   23
Table D that the partial correlation coefficient between openness and GDP is 0.23, and between 
openness and GDP Growth is 0.18. Consequently these positive associations imply that opening up an 
economy could lead to a net happiness gain via higher output, despite the possibility of costs due to 
greater output variability. 
 
Regarding the actual existence of these costs, the effect of Openness is negative although only significant 
at the 8 percent level. An increase in openness from 20% to 30% would have to be compensated by an 
increase in the benefit replacement rate (i.e. benefits/wages) of 10 percentage points. We again test for 
interaction effects. The coefficient on Openness*Personal Income Position is positive (equal to 0.05) and 
significant at the 1 percent level. This implies that the negative effects on happiness of more openness 
are stronger for those on lower incomes in each country. An individual at the bottom of the income 
distribution is hurt 40 percent more by a higher level of openness compared to an individual at the top 
end of the income distribution. There are also some differential effects in terms of educational 
attainment. Compared with people in the bottom education category, those in the middle level are 
significantly less affected by exposure to more openness. 
 
Government Consumption 
In Table 1A in the appendix we deal with two potential objections to our basic specification. If the 
measure of income reported in the surveys is net of taxes and we fail to include what those taxes are 
buying, then we may be underestimating the movements in happiness that we can explain. As a very 
rough measure of what citizens buy with their taxes, we add a measure of government consumption. 
This may include the provision of public goods, like defense spending, building infrastructure and 
enforcing the law. Higher levels of government consumption may also help stabilize consumption.  
 
Government consumption is positively related to happiness, at the 5 percent level of significance. For 
example, if the level of openness of the economy were to rise from 20% to 30%, then a 3 percentage 
point increase in government consumption would be sufficient to compensate individuals in our 
sample. Because higher government consumption must be (ultimately) financed through higher 
taxation, this does not necessarily imply that bigger government is better. Greater taxation may depress 
GDP (as well as GDP growth rates) via work incentive problems. Private sector investment could be 
crowding out. Table D provides some examples. Controlling for country and year fixed effects the 
(partial) correlation coefficient between government consumption and GDP is –0.62, between   24
government consumption and GDP growth is –0.44, and between government consumption and Hours 
Worked is –0.28. Higher levels of government consumption are also positively correlated with the 
unemployment rate. To work out whether big government makes people happier, all these kinds of 
indirect channels must also be taken into account.    
 
Inequality 
Another objection is that the level of inequality in society ought to be included in these regressions. A 
simple reason is that some people view inequality as an expression of fairness, so that the utility 
function presented in equation (1) has to be modified to include this. A second possibility is that 
inequality is a proxy for the amount of social mobility and that a very unequal society may be 
symptomatic of few opportunities for progress. Alesina et al (2001) explore these hypotheses using 
happiness data.  
 
The estimated effect in regression (1) of Table 1A is insignificant. In regression (2) of Table 1A, we 
focus on the European sample. The coefficient on Inequality now becomes negative, although its size 
and significance level are both low. The effect is weaker than in previous work, in part because the data 
have been interpolated and in part because there is some degree of co-linearity between the included 
variables. For example, if we do not include unemployment benefits, a variable that is highly correlated 
with inequality, we find that the coefficient on inequality becomes negative and significant. (Table D 
reports that the correlation of income inequality with unemployment benefits is equal to -0.71). 
 
3.2. Accounting for Happiness 
Table 2 shows the actual proportions of people who declared themselves in the bottom two happiness 
categories (i.e. “not at all satisfied” and “not very satisfied”) as well as the top two categories (i.e. “fairly 
satisfied” and “very satisfied”) between 1975 and 1997 in Europe. The last column of Table 2 shows how 
the predicted score changes between these years. These measurements record the changes in the value 
of the underlying continuous variable from the ordered probit happiness regression in column (2) of 
Table (1) whose units of happiness we now refer to as “utils”. The total change in the happiness score 
from the beginning of the sample period to the end equals -0.11 utils. In other words, there has been a 
slight decline in well-being in Europe. This decline is also reflected in a drop in the proportion of 
people declaring themselves in the top two happiness categories, from 83.3 per cent in 1975 to 78.7 per 
cent in 1997.   25
Table 3 shows what happens when we decompose this overall change in happiness into the parts 
deriving from changes in each of the explanatory variables reported in Table 1. The rise in GDP per 
Capita over the period between 1975 and 1997 increased average happiness by 0.15 utils. The drop in 
the inflation rate by 12 percentage points (on average across the sample) led to a rise in happiness of 
0.10 utils. The decline in SOx Emissions contributed 0.12 utils more to happiness and shorter Hours 
Worked in Europe added 0.11 utils. Increased Life Expectancy increased happiness the most, equal to 0.16 
utils. Smaller gains came from the more generous welfare state (proxied by Unemployment Benefits) that 
added 0.03 utils and also the higher growth rate between the beginning and end of the sample period 
that added 0.04 utils onto happiness. These positive influences contributed, in total, to a rise in 
happiness of 0.7 utils (=0.15+0.10+0.12 +0.11+0.16+0.03+0.04). 
 
On the negative side, the largest adverse effect derived from the rise in unemployment in Europe. It 
subtracted 0.14 utils from happiness. This could be thought of as the ‘fear’ effect that hurts everyone in 
the economy when there is downturn. It does not include the costs to the individuals who have actually 
lost their jobs (which is calculated below). The rise in unemployment has exactly offset the gains in 
happiness from higher GDP per capita. It has also more than cancelled out the gains in happiness 
experienced due to lower inflation rates. Rising family instability, proxied by the Divorce Rate, lowered 
happiness by 0.02 utils. Higher crimes rates lead to a fall of 0.01 utils and increasing Openness cut 0.03 
utils. These negatives combined led, to a total drop in happiness of 0.2 utils (=-0.14-0.02-0.01-0.03). 
 
The net effect of all the positive and negative influences of the aggregate variables was to increase 
happiness by 0.5 utils (=0.7-0.2). 
 
Changing personal characteristics of respondents in our sample between 1975 and 1997 have had 
smaller effects on well-being. Two of the largest effects come from the costs to the individuals who are 
actually unemployed and the lower proportion of the population who are now married (as opposed to 
single, or living as married, divorced, separated or widowed). The higher proportion of unemployed 
people in the sample lowered happiness by 0.03 utils, due to the direct costs of joblessness to these 
people. The lower proportion of married people led to a decline of 0.02 utils. On the positive side, 
more people with higher educations added 0.03 utils. The net effect of all the personal characteristics 
was to lower happiness by 0.02 utils. 
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Combining all the above effects from our explanatory variables (i.e. both aggregate variables and 
personal characteristics) we would have expected happiness to rise across nations by 0.48 utils (=0.50-
0.02). This is a sizeable number. It corresponds to lifting 17 percentage points of the population from 
the lower three happiness categories (“not at all satisfied”, “not very satisfied”, and “fairly satisfied”) into the 
top category (“very satisfied”). This is equivalent to increasing the predicted proportion of the population 
in the top happiness category from 26 percent to 43 percent.
22 However overall happiness across the 
344,294 people in the sample actually dropped by 0.1 utils, due to an unexplained time trend that 
reduced happiness by 0.55 utils. One possible explanation is to insist on omitted variables. Candidates 
include increased job insecurity and stress at work for which comparable panel data across nations and 
time is difficult to come by. One would have to claim that happiness would have increased substantially 
were it not for the negative impact of changes in this unknown variable. An alternative is to explore if 
adaptation or other forms of relative income effects are present in the data.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
There is something fundamentally plausible in the idea that the difference in happiness between 
primitive-man and us is not proportional to the differences in our incomes. The Easterlin-Paradox 
illustrates this: over time average happiness levels do not change in countries that experience large 
increases in income. This evidence is enough to reject the hypothesis that absolute income is the only 
argument of the utility function. One way to explain the paradox is through a more general utility 
function, for example, one that displays adaptation to income (see, for example, Easterlin (1974)). 
Indeed, Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (1997) show that GDP per capita enters positively in a 
country panel with fixed effects, but that the effects wear off over time. An alternative approach points 
to omitted variables. For example the paradox could be produced by ignoring the role of variables that 
could be expected to vary positively with income and negatively with happiness, such as working hours.  
 
In this paper we pursue this view further. We start with an estimate of the effect of income in a country 
panel and show that, for almost 400,000 people across 12 OECD countries during 23 years, the 
probability that people declare themselves happy is increasing in income. Happiness data are also 
 
22 Since 0.15=Φ(-47.6+0.48-(-46.9))-Φ(-47.6-(-46.9)) where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution, -47.6 is the mean score 
and -46.9 is the top cut point from regression (2) in Table 1A. 
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correlated with variables that enter a standard utility function in the way predicted by theory. For 
example, happiness responses are positively correlated with life expectancy and measures of the 
generosity of the welfare state. They are negatively correlated with the average number of hours 
worked, environmental degradation (measured by the level of Sulphur Oxide emissions), the rate of 
divorce, the crime rate, the level of openness to trade as well as the rate of inflation and the 
unemployment rate. Most of these correlations reach statistical significance at the 10-percent level or 
less. A standard utility function can rationalize these correlations. Furthermore, when the effects are 
allowed to vary across groups, they do so in a way that is consistent with the theory. For example, 
environmental degradation adversely affects the happiness levels of the young and the rich. These 
results lend some support to those that have advocated the use of more comprehensive and less 
materialistic measures of progress than GDP. The Measure of Economic Welfare proposed by 
Nordhaus and Tobin (1973) and the Human Development Index, produced by the United Nations, are 
just two examples. 
 
We then estimate the part of the change over time in reported happiness that can be accounted for by 
changes in each variable, based on their actual change and their estimated impact on happiness. The 
increase in income per capita has been one of the biggest contributors to raising happiness. This is 
almost totally compensated by the negative impact of the increase in the unemployment rate. 
Interestingly, the rest of the other variables have moved favorably over our sample period. For 
example, changes in life expectancy, hours worked and SOx emissions are also net contributors to 
happiness levels. This means that adding the actual impact of other variables besides income lead one 
to expect happiness levels that are even higher, making the unexplained trend in happiness data larger 
than when just changes in income are considered. In other words, introducing omitted variables only 
worsens the income-without-happiness paradox.  
 
In brief, there is some evidence that people care about other variables besides income. This may 
provide some support to the idea that GDP is not a good measure of welfare and that we should 
develop broader indicators of gross domestic happiness, similar to the index of “human development” 
developed by the United Nations. Although this idea appears related to the Easterlin paradox, such 
broader measures do not help explain why happiness is stationary since they have moved, on average, 
in a favorable way.    28
 
Table A 
Happiness in 12 OECD Nations (Europe and The United States) 
from 1975 to 1997. 
  Europe  United States 
YEAR  Not at all  Not Very  Satisfied Very  Not too  Pretty  Very 
 Satisfied  Satisfied    Satisfied  Happy  Happy  Happy
              
1975 3.9  12.8  55.7  27.6  13.21 54.5  32.29 
1976 4.2  13.8  53.6  28.4  12.18  53.21  34.61 
1977 4.4  13.4  52.2  29.9  11.54  53.35  35.11 
1978 4.5  12.3  52.3  30.9  9.15 56.6  34.26 
1979 4.4  13.5  52.1  30.0  n.a.    
1980 4.1  12.9  53.7  29.3  13.16  53.53  33.31 
1981 6.8  14.4  49.5  29.3  n.a.    
1982 4.1  13.0  53.7  29.2  12.73  55.04  32.23 
1983 6.0  14.5  54.5  25.1  13.17  55.71  31.11 
1984 5.5  14.7  53.2  26.7  12.7 52.47  34.83 
1985 6.0  16.2  53.7  24.0  11.23  60.41  28.36 
1986 5.9  15.7  54.5  23.9  10.67 56.7  32.63 
1987 5.7  16.1  54.7  23.6  12.17  56.54  31.29 
1988 5.3  20.0  51.4  23.4  9.12 56.77  34.11 
1989 4.3  12.8  55.8  27.1  9.67 57.36  32.97 
1990 4.5  11.1  52.7  31.8  8.96 56.78  34.26 
1991 3.7  13.6  54.5  28.3  10.99  58.48  30.53 
1992 4.4  14.5  54.4  26.7  n.a.    
1993 5.2  16.1  53.8  25.0  11.52  57.86  30.62 
1994 4.5  15.2  55.0  25.3  11.89  59.58  28.53 
1995 5.0  14.6  55.6  24.8  n.a.    
1996 4.3  14.4  58.2  23.1  11.47  57.77  30.76 
1997 4.5  16.8  53.8  24.9  n.a.    
             
Notes: All numbers are expressed as percentages. For Europe they are based on a total 
344,294 observations and for the United States a total of 26,855 observations. For the United 
States, ‘n.a.’ refers to ‘not available’ data due to there being no General Social Survey conducted 
for these years. 
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Table B-US 
Happiness in the United States: 1975 to 1997. 
Reported   All  Unemployed  Marital Status 
Happiness     Married  Divorced 
Very Happy  32.05  17.23  39.45  19.90 
Pretty Happy  56.50  53.08  53.07  62.50 
Not too Happy  11.45  29.69  7.48  17.60 
 
Reported Sex  Income  Quartiles 
Happiness  Male  Female       1
st 2
nd      3rd     4th 
     (Lowest)      (Highest)
Very  Happy  31.70  32.33  25.01  29.01 34.42 40.47 
Pretty  Happy  57.15  55.98  56.60  58.62 57.08 53.64 
Not too Happy  11.15  11.69  18.38  12.37  8.50  5.89 




Life Satisfaction in Europe: 1975 to 1997. 
Reported   All  Unemployed  Marital Status 
Life Satisfaction      Married  Divorced 
Very satisfied  26.21  15.79  27.73  18.42 
Fairly satisfied  54.38  45.75  54.42  52.28 
Not very satisfied  14.59  25.48  13.51  21.12 
Not at all satisfied  4.82  12.99  4.34  8.17 
 
Reported Sex  Income  Quartiles 
Life Satisfaction  Male  Female       1st  2
nd      3rd     4th 
     (Lowest)      (Highest)
Very  satisfied  25.82  26.58  21.74  23.94 26.80 32.21 
Fairly  satisfied  55.00  53.79  50.98  54.79 56.42 55.23 
Not very satisfied  14.29  14.88  19.33  16.13  13.16  9.91 
Not at all satisfied  4.89  4.75  7.95  5.13  3.63  2.65 
Note: Based on 344,294 observations. All numbers are expressed as percentages. Table C 
Summary Statistics for the Aggregate Variables, 12 OECD Nations 
(Europe and the United States): 1975-97. 
Variable Units  Obs.  Mean  Std. Min. Max. 
       Dev.     
            
GDP per Capita  GDP (1990 US$ and x-rates)  Total=245 16414  5159  5284  30411
                       - between    n=12  5175  6874  24407
                       - within    t =20.4  2212  11155  24741
GDP per Capita (in logs)  log GDP (1990 US$ and x-rates)  Total=245 9.647  0.365  8.6  10.3 
                       - between    n=12  0.385  8.8 10.1 
                       - within    t =20.4  0.136  9.3 10.2 
GDP Growth  ∆ GDP (1990 US$ & x-rates)  Total=245 324 342 -563 1757 
                       - between    n=12  112  91  537 
                       - within    t =20.4  325  -552  1545 
GDP Growth (in logs)  ∆ log GDP (1990 US$ & x-rates) Total=245 0.021 0.021 -0.030 0.107 
                       - between    n=12  0.009  0.011  0.041 
                       - within    t =20.4  0.020  -0.030  0.087 
Unemployment Rate  Proportion  Total=245 0.093  0.039  0.032  0.241 
                       - between    n=12  0.039  0.063  0.203 
                       - within    t =20.4  0.023  0.035  0.142 
Inflation Rate  Proportion Total=245 0.069  0.055  -0.007  0.245 
                       - between    n=12  0.035  0.032  0.161 
                       - within    t =20.4  0.044  -0.037  0.231 
Unemployment Benefits  Proportion (b/w)  Total=245 0.296  0.164  0.003  0.731 
                       - between    n=12  0.162  0.022  0.583 
                       - within    t =20.4  0.037  0.155  0.443 
Government Consumption  log(1+consumption/gdp)  Total=245 0.168 0.030 0.105  0.255 
                       - between    n=12  0.029  0.137  0.233 
                       - within    t =20.4  0.011  0.114  0.198 
Crime Rate  log (total per 100,000 people)  Total=245 4.034  1.500  -0.105  6.220 
                       - between    n=12  1.515  0.815  5.787 
                       - within    t =20.4  0.612  1.500  5.803 
            
…continued next page            
  30continued from previous page ..            
Variable Units  Obs.  Mean  Std. Min. Max. 
       Dev.     
SOx Emissions  Kg per capita  Total=245 48.8  23.1  8  103 
   n=12  18.4  20.8  90.0 
    t =20.4  15.3  9.4  82.3 
Life Expectancy  Years  Total=245 75.2  1.6 71.3 78.5 
   n=12   1.1 73.7 77.3 
   t =20.4   1.3 72.0 78.7 
Divorce Rate  Total per 1,000 people  Total=245 1.745  1.264  0  5.220 
   n=12  1.323 0 4.832 
   t =20.4  0.268  0.447  3.279 
Hours Worked  log (Annual hours)  Total=245 7.462  0.031  7.377  7.555 
   n=12  0.006  7.441  7.464 
   t =20.4  0.031  7.377  7.555 
Openness log((Imports+Exports)/GDP)  Total=245 -0.542  0.522  -1.845  0.430 
   n=12  0.533  -1.675  0.250 
   t =20.4  0.095  -0.877  -0.257
Income Inequality  Gini Coefficient Total=245 0.284  0.036  0.224  0.364 
   n=12  0.035  0.232  0.328 
   t =20.4  0.013  0.247  0.322 
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Table D 
Partial Correlation Coefficients Between the Aggregate Variables, Controlling for Country and Year Fixed Effects 
12 OECD Nations (Europe and the United States) from 1975 to 1997. 






















              
Life Expectancy  0.13             
            
          
             
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
1.00
SOx Emissions    0.27    0.03 1.00
Hours Worked    0.23  -0.23  -0.01  1.00
Crime Rate  0.03 0.17 0.04 0.28 1.00
Divorce Rate  -0.11 0.37 -0.07 -0.27 0.20 1.00
Inflation Rate  -0.20 -0.07 -0.13 -0.21 0.01 0.00 1.00
GDP Growth  0.42 -0.02 0.15 0.17   0.11 -0.16 -0.15 1.00
Unemployment Rate  -0.22  0.44   0.02  -0.07   0.07   0.28  -0.37  -0.12  1.00       
Openness  0.23 0.10 -0.15 0.31 0.21 0.01 0.14 0.18 -0.04 1.00
Unemp. Benefits  -0.11 -0.12 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.14 -0.23 0.01 0.15 -0.13 1.00
Gov. Consumption  -0.62 -0.17 -0.12 -0.28 -0.07 0.23 0.05 -0.44 0.14 -0.24 0.33 1.00
Income Inequality  -0.13 0.12 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 0.00 -0.40 -0.19
*Based on 245 observations 
 
 
 Table E 
More Summary Statistics: 12 Nations (Europe & U.S) from 1975 to 1997. No of Observations=371,149. 
Variable Units  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Personal Characteristics          
   Employment Status  Employed  Dummy 0.413  0.493  0  1 
 Unemployed  Dummy 0.049  0.217  0  1 
 Self  Employed  Dummy 0.102  0.302  0  1 
 Retired  Dummy 0.172  0.377  0  1 
 Keeping  Home  Dummy 0.192  0.394  0  1 
 In  School  Dummy 0.072  0.258  0  1 
   Male  Dummy 0.486  0.500  0  1 
   Age  Years 44  18  15  98 
   Age Squared  (Years)2 2216 1670 225  9604 
   Personal Income Position   log(ratio) 0  0.332  -0.619  0.619 
   Education  Bottom  Dummy 0.370  0.483  0  1 
 Lower  Dummy 0.370  0.483  0  1 
 Higher  Dummy 0.260  0.439  0  1 
   Marital Status  Single       Dummy 0.220  0.414  0  1 
 Married  Dummy 0.612  0.487  0  1 
 Defacto  Married  Dummy 0.037  0.190  0  1 
 Divorced  Dummy 0.036  0.186  0  1 
 Separated  Dummy 0.013  0.113  0  1 
 Widowed  Dummy 0.082  0.274  0  1 
   Size of  Community  Rural                  Dummy 0.322  0.467  0  1 
 Middle  Dummy 0.344  0.475  0  1 
 Large  Dummy 0.334  0.472  0  1 
Country Dummies          
    Belgium  Dummy 0.082  0.274  0  1 
    Britain  Dummy 0.091  0.288  0  1 
    Denmark  Dummy 0.095  0.293  0  1 
    France  Dummy 0.104  0.305  0  1 
    Germany  Dummy 0.104  0.306  0  1 
    Ireland  Dummy 0.070  0.255  0  1 
    Italy  Dummy 0.100  0.300  0  1 
   Netherlands  Dummy 0.098  0.297  0  1 
   Greece  Dummy 0.071  0.257  0  1 
   Spain  Dummy 0.055  0.228  0  1 
   Portugal  Dummy 0.058  0.234  0  1 
   United States  Dummy 0.072  0.259  0  1 
Time Trend  Years 1987  6.465  1975  1997 
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Table 1 
Happiness Equations for 12 OECD Nations from 1975 to 1997. 
(1) 





Life Satisfaction  Coefficient  Std Error  Coefficient  Std Error 
Aggregate Variables       
  GDP per Capita  0.455  0.179  0.539  0.235 
  GDP Growth  1.098  0.575 1.138* 0.618 
  Life Expectancy  0.032  0.021  0.034  0.022 
  SOx Emissions  -0.003  0.001  -0.003  0.001 
  Hours Worked  -1.192  0.337  -1.352  0.451 
  Crime Rate  -0.029*  0.017  -0.023  0.018 
  Divorce Rate  -0.056*  0.035  -0.050  0.038 
  Inflation Rate  -0.755*  0.416  -0.839  0.438 
  Unemployment Rate  -2.797  0.556  -2.761  0.652 
  Openness  -0.186*  0.105  -0.265  0.118 
  Unemployment Benefits  0.723  0.167  0.754  0.168 
Personal Characteristics       
  Personal Income Position  0.453  0.015  0.464  0.016 
  Employment State  Unemployed  -0.491  0.015  -0.495  0.016 
 Self-Employed  0.031  0.009  0.026  0.010 
 Retired  0.046  0.013  0.046  0.013 
 Keeping  Home 0.014*  0.008  0.016  0.008 
 In  School  0.202  0.016  0.195  0.017 
  Male  -0.071  0.006  -0.069  0.007 
  Age  -0.029  0.001  -0.029  0.001 
  Age Squared  3.3e-4  1.0e-5  3.3e-4  1.1e-5 
  Education  Lower  0.062  0.008  0.062  0.008 
 Higher  0.167  0.011  0.167  0.012 
  Marital Status  Married  0.144  0.009  0.132  0.009 
 Defacto  0.030  0.014 0.021 0.013 
 Divorced  -0.240  0.012  -0.262  0.013 
 Separated  -0.333  0.017  -0.336  0.019 
 Widowed  -0.157  0.011  -0.151  0.011 
  Size of Community  Middle  -0.038  0.007  -0.039  0.007 
 Large  -0.139  0.009  -0.140  0.010 
Year Dummies  Yes   Yes   
Country Dummies  Yes   Yes   
Number of Observations  371,149    344,294   
Pseudo R
2   0.092   0.094   
Notes: [1] Regressions are ordered probits. Bold-face is significant at 5 percent level; * is significant at 10 
per cent level. [2] Log likelihood of reg.(1)=-370,982; Log likelihood of reg.(2)=-346,176. [3] Cut points 
(standard errors) are -41.3 (12.4), -40.4 (12.4), -38.7 (12.4) for reg. (1); -49.5 (17.8), -48.6 (17.8), -46.9 (17.8) 
for reg. (2). [4] Clustered standard errors. [5] The Dependent Variable is the categorical response to the 
question “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”.   35
 
Table 2 
Actual and Explained Changes in Happiness in Europe from 
1975 to 1997 (11 Nations and 344,294 observations ). 
 Actual  Predicted 
  “Unhappy” “Happy”  ∆ “Happiness” Score: 
YEAR  (Not at all Satisfied or   (Satisfied or   Year t 
  Not Very Satisfied)  Very Satisfied)    –  Year (t-1) 
1975 16.7  83.3   
1976 18.0  82.0  -0.011 
1977 17.8  82.2  0.031 
1978 16.8  83.2  0.032 
1979 17.9  82.1  -0.030 
1980 17.0  83.0  0.005 
1981 21.3  78.7  -0.103 
1982 17.1  82.9  0.094 
1983 20.4  79.6  -0.146 
1984 20.2  79.8  0.039 
1985 22.3  77.7  -0.083 
1986 21.6  78.4  0.009 
1987 21.7  78.3  -0.006 
1988 25.2  74.8  -0.054 
1989 17.2  82.8  0.202 
1990 15.6  84.4  0.109 
1991 17.3  82.7  -0.080 
1992 19.0  81.0  -0.065 
1993 21.3  78.7  -0.069 
1994 19.7  80.3  0.038 
1995 19.6  80.4  -0.015 
1996 18.7  81.3  -0.009 
1997 21.3  78.7  -0.003 
     Σ   =  -0.113 
Note: The last column shows how the predicted happiness score changes 
between each year. These measurements record the changes in the value of the 
underlying continuous variable from the ordered probit happiness regression in 
column (2) of Table (1). 
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Table 3 








∆ Explanatory Variable 
(from 1975 to 1997) 
(1)*(2) 
∆ Happiness 
(from 1975 to 1997) 
Aggregate Variables       
  GDP per Capita  0.539  0.274 0.147   
  GDP Growth  1.138  0.036 0.042   
  Life Expectancy  0.034  4.636 0.158   
  SOx Emissions  -0.003  -39.420 0.118   
  Hours Worked  -1.352  -0.079 0.107   
  Crime Rate  -0.023  0.588 -0.014   
  Divorce Rate  -0.050  0.414 -0.021   
  Inflation Rate  -0.839  -0.117 0.099   
  Unemployment Rate  -2.761  0.052 -0.144   
  Openness  -0.265  0.125 -0.033   
  Unemployment Benefits  0.754  0.045 0.034  Σ=0.495
Personal Characteristics        
  Personal Income Position  0.464  0.009 0.004 
  Employment State  Unemployed  -0.495  0.066 -0.033   
 Self-Employed  0.026  -0.014 -3.7e-4   
 Retired  0.046  0.046 0.002   
 Keeping  Home 0.016  -0.108 -0.002   
 In  School  0.195  0.028 0.005   
  Male  -0.069  0.011 -0.001 
  Age  -0.029  0.110 -0.003 
  Age Squared  3.3e-4  2.040 0.001 
  Education  Lower  0.062  -0.033 -0.002   
 Higher  0.167  0.174 0.029   
  Marital Status  Married  0.132  -0.138 -0.018   
 Defacto    0.021  0.058 0.001   
 Divorced  -0.262  0.029 -0.008   
 Separated  -0.336  0.008 -0.003   
 Widowed  -0.151  -0.012 0.002   
  Size of Community  Middle  -0.039  0.052 -0.002   
 Large  -0.140  -0.038 0.005  Σ=-0.022
TIME TREND (1975-97)    22    -0.546
Country Dummies       -0.040
       
Number of Observations  344,294   Total = -0.113
      
Note: The coefficients in column (1) are taken from Table 1, column (2). 
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Appendix 
 
Data Sources and Definitions 
 
Sources 
The Euro-Barometer Survey Series [1975-1997]
The Euro-Barometer Surveys were conducted by various research firms operated within European 
Community nations under the direction of the European Commission. Either a nationwide multi-stage 
probability sample or a nationwide stratified quota sample of persons aged 15 and over was selected in each 
nation. The cumulative data file used contains 36 attitudinal, 21 demographic and 10 analysis variables selected 
from the European Communities Studies, 1970-1973, and Euro-Barometers, 3-38. 
 
The United States General Social Survey [1972-1997] 
The General Social Surveys have been conducted by the National Research Center at the University of 
Chicago since 1972. Interviews have been undertaken during February, March and April of 1972, 1973, 1974, 
1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1994. 
There were no surveys in 1979, 1981 and 1992. There were a total of 32380 completed interviews (1613 in 
1972, 1504 in 1973, 1484 in 1974, 1490 in 1975, 1499 in 1976, 1530 in 1977, 1532 in 1978, 1468 in 1980, 1506 
in 1982, 354 in the 1982 black oversample, 1599 in 1983, 1473 in 1984, 1534 in 1985, 1470 in 1986, 1466 in 
1987, 353 in the 1987 black oversample, 1481 in 1988, 1537 in 1989, 1372 in 1990, 1517 in 1991, 1606 in 1993 




LIFE SATISFACTION: The individual responses to the Euro-Barometer Survey question that reads: On the 
whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”.  
Accordingly, four categories were created. For the United States the data come from the US General 
Social Survey (1972-1997) which has a “happiness” question that reads, “Taken all together, how would you 
say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”. 
GDP PER CAPITA: Log of Real GDP per capita at the price levels and exchange rates of 1990 in U.S. dollars 
(measured in thousands) obtained from OECD National Accounts (various years). 
GDP GROWTH: The year-to-year change in GDP PER CAPITA (=GDP PER CAPITA(t)-GDP PER 
CAPITA (t-1)). 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: Unemployment rates from OECD Employment Outlook. 
INFLATION RATE: The rate of change in the CPI from OECD Historical Statistics. 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: The average level of benefit generosity, measured by the replacement rate, 
from the OECD. This index of (pre-tax) unemployment insurance benefit entitlements divided by the 
wage, is calculated as the unweighted mean of 18 parameters based on all combinations of the 
following scenarios: (i) three unemployment durations: the first year, the second and third years, and 
the fourth and fifth years of unemployment. (ii) three family and income situations: a single person, a 
married person with a dependent spouse, and a married person with a spouse in work. (iii) two 
different levels of previous earnings: average earnings and two-thirds of average earnings. These 
parameters are all measured for persons with a long record of previous employment. See OECD Jobs 
Study [1994]. 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION: The logarithm of government final consumption expenditures as a 
proportion of GDP, from OECD National Accounts Data. 
CRIME RATE: The logarithm of the total number of serious assaults per 100,000 people, from Interpol’s 
International Crime Statistics (various issues). SOx EMISSIONS: Total sulphur oxide emissions (ie SO, SO2 and higher derivatives) in kilograms per capita 
from OECD Health Statistics. Values prior to 1980 for each country in the sample were interpolated 
using the 1980 values. 
LIFE EXPECTANCY: Average life expectancy at birth for males and females, measured in years, from 
OECD Health Statistics. A linear interpolation was used to obtain the life expectancies in 1975-76 for 
Ireland and 1975-1979 for Britain. 
DIVORCE RATE: Number of divorces per 1,000 people from the United Nations' Demographic Yearbook and 
Eurostat’s Demographic Statistics (various issues). 
HOURS WORKED: The logarithm of average annual hours worked, from OECD Employment Outlook (various 
issues). 
INCOME INEQUALITY: The Gini coefficient, from the Luxembourg Income Study. This measure is based 
on after-tax household disposable income (using an equivalence scale equal to the square root of the 
number of persons in the household). 
OPENNESS: The logarithm of the sum of exports and imports as a proportion of GDP, from OECD 
National Accounts Data 
 
 
Personal Characteristics (all from Eurobarometer and GSS surveys). 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: A set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on the respondent’s 
employment status: unemployed, retired, housewife, in school or the military and self-employed. The 
base category is employed. 
MALE: A dummy taking the value 1 if respondent is male and 0 otherwise. 
AGE: The respondent's age in years. 
AGE SQUARED: The square of the respondent's age in years. 
PERSONAL INCOME POSITION: The logarithm of the income of an individual relative to the mean 
income. It is approximated using data on individual income quartiles and the standard deviation of 
income. The latter is calculated as σ=log(Y90/Y10)/3.28 assuming a lognormal distribution for income 
where Y90/Y10 is the 90/10 ratio from the Luxembourg Income Study. Using the midpoints of the four 
income quartiles, the log of average income for individuals in the first, second, third and fourth 
quartiles equals log Y   -1.15σ, log Y   -0.32σ, log Y +0.32σ, log Y +1.15σ, where Y   is mean income per 
capita. Hence Personal Income Position equals -1.15σ, -0.32σ, 0.32σ and 1.15σ, respectively. 
EDUCATION: This heading refers to a set of dummy variables which take the value 1 depending on the age 
at which the respondent finished full-time education: up to 15-18 years old or up to more than 18 years 
old. The base category is education up to 14 years old. 
MARITAL STATUS: A set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on the respondent's marital 
status: married, living as married, defacto married, divorced, separated or widowed. The base category 
is never married. 
SIZE OF COMMUNITY: A set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on whether the respondent 
lives in a small/middle sized town or a large city. The base category is a rural area or village.  
NUMBER OF TEENAGE CHILDREN: The total number of 8-15 year olds living at home. 
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Table 1A 




Europe and United States 
(2) 
Europe 
Life Satisfaction  Coefficient  Std Error  Coefficient  Std Error 
Aggregate Variables        
   GDP per Capita  0.631  0.258  0.676  0.256 
   GDP Growth  1.471  0.622  1.528  0.644 
   Life Expectancy  0.041  0.020  0.046  0.021 
   SO Emissions  -0.003  0.001  -0.003  0.001 
   Hours Worked  -1.115  0.337  -1.217  0.481 
   Crime Rate  -0.028*  0.023  -0.023  0.017 
   Divorce Rate  -0.081  0.038  -0.079  0.041 
   Inflation Rate  -0.738  0.369  -0.837*  0.519 
   Unemployment Rate  -2.814  0.545  -2.879  0.643 
   Openness  -0.191*  0.103  -0.264  0.118 
   Unemployment Benefits  0.550  0.198  0.554  0.223 
   Government Consumption  2.373  1.369  2.414  1.208 
   Income Inequality  0.019  0.596  -0.112  0.735 
Personal Characteristics         
  Personal Income Position  0.456 0.016  0.468 0.017 
  Employment Status  Unemployed  -0.489 0.015  -0.494 0.016 
 Self-Employed  0.032 0.009  0.027 0.010 
 Retired  0.043 0.013  0.045 0.013 
 Keeping  Home  0.018 0.008  0.020 0.008 
 In  School  0.206 0.016  0.196 0.017 
  Male  -0.071 0.006  -0.069 0.007 
  Age  -0.029 0.001  -0.029 0.001 
  Age Squared  3.2e-4 1.0e-5  3.2e-4 1.1e-5 
  Education  Lower  0.063 0.007  0.061 0.008 
 Higher  0.166 0.011  0.166 0.012 
  Marital Status  Married  0.161 0.009  0.149 0.009 
 Defacto  Married  0.035 0.014  0.025* 0.013 
 Divorced  -0.226 0.012  -0.250 0.013 
 Separated  -0.319 0.017  -0.324 0.019 
 Widowed  -0.142 0.011  -0.135 0.011 
  Size of Community  Middle  -0.038 0.007  -0.039 0.007 
 Large  -0.142 0.009  -0.142 0.010 
  No.of teenage children  1  -0.043 0.006  -0.043 0.007 
 2  -0.046 0.007  -0.050 0.008 
  ≥ 3  -0.077 0.012  -0.102 0.013 
Year Dummies  Yes   Yes  
Country Dummies  Yes   Yes  
Number of Observations  368,566    341,721   
Pseudo R2   0.092   0.094  
Notes: [1] Ordered probits reported. Bold-face is significant at 5 percent level; * at 10 per cent level. [2] 
Log likelihoods of reg. (1)=-368,445; reg.(2)=-343,632. [3] Cut points (standard errors) are -48.7 (11.0), -
47.8 (11.0), -46.1 (11.0) for reg. (1); -47.2 (17.3), -46.3 (17.3), -44.6 (17.3) for reg. (2). [4] Clustered 
standard errors. [5] The Dependent Variable is the categorical response to the question: “On the whole, are 
you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”. References 
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